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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
J!YRA K. BU'l'LER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

jfARVIN JAY BUTLER,

Case No.
11662

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
rrhe gravamen of defendant's petition is to deprive
of total custody of her minor children as a punitive
m<>asure for her alleged failure to compel the children
to ahi<k by the terms of custody provisions of a prt'viously entered decree of divorce.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the close of defendant's evidence (he being the
only witness) the trial court granted plaintiff's motion
to dismiss the contempt proceeding and awarded the
plaintiff $600.00 by way of attorney's fees. The defendant
was granted affirmative relief authorizing him to take
the children of the parties as deductions on his income
tax returns and to delete the plaintiff from a life intrust.

p}<u...Jf/

Defendant's petition was filed on September 10,
1968 (R. 10). On the sarnH day defendant filed a motion
for change of Yenue from Davis Countv,
. in which co11nh.
the decree of divorce was entered, to Utah County. 'l'lw
motion for change of venue was denied by the fonnal
order of the court on November 30, 19G8 (R. 12). Tlw
notice of appeal in the instant matter (R.16) specifically
refers to the judgment entered on the 1st day of May,
1969, with no reference to the denial of the motion for
change of venue.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant claims that this court should, upon the
record, conclude that the plaintiff is guilty of contempt
and that as a punitive measure she should be denied
custody of her minor children.
STATEMEN'l' OF FACTS
Defendant's statement is a self serving statement
of his own testimony. He omits important facets that
justify the adverse ruling. He makes no appropriate
reference to the independent actions of others, including the. children, and the overreaching and imperious
conduct of himself.
The parties were married twice, each to the other.
'l'he first divorce was in 1966 and the second on the 17th
day of October, 1967, pursuant to stipulation as to property matters, custody, child support and alimony (R.1-5).
By the decree, the plaintiff was given the care, custody

and control of the minor children with reasonable rights

of visitation on the part of the defendant. The defendant
was granted the right to have the care, custody and control of the minor children for a period of ninety days
during each summer thereafter. The decree is silent
with
to the right of the defendant to take the
t•er::.;onal belongings of the children or any property in
Uie control of the plaintiff incident to his right of custody
but which he demanded by Exhibit 3, which lists an imtiosing array of articles, including bicycles, outdoor
'"tnip11wnt, radios, cameras, sewing equipment, a 30-30
rifle, binoculars and clothing and accessories, both for
summer and cold weather. The defendant is an airline
captain residing in San Francisco with annual earnings
in excess of $30,000.00 (Rep. Tr. 20) and he was obligated
to pay $80.00 per month per child as child support, except during the time he had custody (R.1-5).
On May 20, when defendant went to Provo to pick up

hi.s children, the children came out of the house to meet
him. Defendant testified that the children knew what he
was there for but they did not have all of the articles
that he had requested (Rep. Tr. 30). On this occasion
the defendant asked the children "Where's the rest of
.rnur belongings¥" They told him that·
mother had
forbid them from bringing any other belongings. The
defendant then asked Julie to go back into the house and
get the list (Exhibit 3) so that they could go over it
(Rep. Tr. 31). ThP defendant did not take the children
on the occasion afforded him because they did not have
the articles demanded.
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Aronnd the 5th of Jnne when defendant obtairn:d
custody of Brett and John, he appeared at the Seethalf'r
residence and had a face to face meeting with plaintiff:
"And I rang the bell, and Mrs. Seethaler appeared at the door. And I told her that I had
come to get the children.
She said to me that: "We are not fully unpacked from the move. Do you want to take Brt>t
with just the few things that I have unpacked!''
And I said : "Yes."
She said to me: "Julie is not going." And l
told her I would like to speak with Julie.
She said: "John's at the plant. They'll bring
him, and you can talk to him there."
Q. What did she give you for Bret in the way
of clothing?

A. She gave me a small cardboard box about
this square (indicating) with some old odds and
ends.
And Bret came out, and he was wearing older
clothing that certainly wasn't suitable to ride on
an airplane with.
Q. All right. Did you take Bret that morning
of the 5th?

A. I did.
Q. Did you go down to the plant to get John 1
A. Yes. (Rep. Tr. 46).

On the same day defendant went to the Seethaler
plant at Provo and got the boy John. The defendant complained of the fact that he couldn't pick John up at tlw
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plal'l' of re:,;idmw1· and had to go to the
plant
for that purposP (Rep. Tr. 47). The defendant then complained ahout having to take John and Bret to Salt Lake
and then to a local devartment store where both of them
were outfitted with clothing (Rep. Tr. 48-49). From Salt
l,akl' the defendant took the two boys to Ogden and it
was that night that J olm called his mother around midnight and asked her to come and get him. Mr. and Mrs.
went to Ogden, picked up the boy, returned
him to Provo and then followed the rather traumatic experit•nce of police intervention at the Seethaler plant
\\'h1•n• John was taken first to the Police Station and then
to tlw J nvenilP Court after which the defendant took
lioth of the boys to the San Francisco area.
'rhe depositions of all of the children had been pre\·iously taken by defendant at Provo, Utah (Rep. Tr.
ThP children at the request of defendant (Rep. Tr.
were prPsent at the hearing before the court in
Farmington, but on the motion of the defendant were exduded from the courtroom during his testimony (Rep.
11 r. 2-4). The only testimony adduced was that of the
cl.efendant, after which he rested his case (Rep. Tr. 70).
Tho children were available but not called nor was Mrs.
NPdhaler, the former Mrs. Butler. Although defendant':.;
r·ounsel was fully aware of the fact that he could reopen
his case and adduced further testimony on the theory of
f'onternpt, he did not do so (Rep. Tr. 89-90).

POINT I.
THE PROPRIETY OF THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'/\
FEES.

A reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded a wifr
who contests a modification petition where the custod)
of children is involved. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 U. 2d
36, 368 P.2d 264. The Supreme Court may determilll·
whether additional counsel fees should be allowed, and
may allow costs of appeal to appellant, such as filing
fees, printing costs and the like. Dahlberg L Dahlber_u,
77 U. 157, 292 P. 214. The allowance of alimony and expenses of divorce trial, including attorney's fees, an·
largely matters within the discretion of the court which
tries the case. Burtt v. Burtt, 59 U. ±57, 204 P. 91. Even
where the District Court had no jurisdiction of status of
marriage between parties to husband's divorce action
because of noncompliance with residence requirement, it
could nevertheless award to the wife temporary alimony,
expenses of suit and attorney's fees, the allowance and
the amount thereof being largely within the sound
cretion of the trial court. Weis0 v. Weiss, 111 U. 353, rni
P.2d 1005.
In the instant matter, plaintiff in her answ<-·r to d('fendant's petition, alleged that she had been rt>qnired ti 1
employ counsel in the defense thereof and that she shonhl
fees to be paid by tlw
be entitled to reasonable
defendant to her for the use and benefit of her attorney8
herein. DPfendant's answer is not made a part of the
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1·t·turd oil a1Jveal lrnt ,,·as i·efern•d to in the opening

of counsel (Rep. Tr. 13). Rule 73 (h), Utah
Hules uf Ci?;il Prucfd·ure, permits this court on a proper
suggestion or of its own initiative to require the record to
hP supplemented. vVe doubt, however, that counsel will
<lisagrPe with the fact that the plaintiff filed an answer
to the• petition and prayed for attorney's fees as indicated.
In mitigation of our failure to file a designation of
tltl• record, defendant's designation did not include the
rmnvlete record and he did not serve a statement of the
points on which he intended to rely on the appeal, all
as rt>qnired by R1ile 75(b). If a statement of points had
hePn made, it would have served as a springboard for the
respondent's designation of the record as contemplated
b,v Ride 75( a). What we have said with reference to the
answer filed by the plaintiff to defendant's petition applies equally to the objections that were filed to the motion for change of venue, which objections are not made
a pa.rt of the file on the appeal not having been included
in defendant's designation.

Defendant in his brief, in light of the present record
on a1Jpeal, ca::-;ts some sort of a cloud upon the propriety
of attornev's fees when he says on page 20 that "Unacr01tntably, this request was granted by the trial court."
"\.s::-;uming attorney's fees to be proper in this type of an
action, we subscribe to the previous expressions of this
eourt and to the citations that defendant makes with referenee to the subject that in the absence of proof or of

8
a stipulation, attorney's fot•::; rna>r not be awarded. 'l'IH·
objection made by defendant at the time of trial as t11
attorney's fees was that they were not pro1Jer in rnattl'n
of this kind.
Plaintiff's counsel proposed that if he were s'.vorn
and testified that he would say that $750.00 is a reasonable fee and called attention to the time spent in attendance at the taking by defendant of six depositions which
included the three children of the parties and Mr. Seethaler, the present husband of the plaintiff, the time co11sumed in the preparation of the pleadings, resisting th1·
motion for change of venue and the trial of the instaitl
matter. In response, the following occurred:
THE COURT: Do you have anything tlw 1
you want to say, Mr.
MR HOW ARD: Vv ell, Your Honor, there
nothing more important to the lawyer than th1·
payment of his attorney's fees, and I don't oppose
attorney's fees, per se. I am in favor of the payment of fees.
But I do take this po·sition: You're not entitled to attorney's fees after the divorce automatically, and you're certainly not entitled to attorney's fees to defend a matter that's created b.'·
rnur own conduct. And I've got some
it and it's- * * * But the thing I'm trying ti1
say is that we're forced into this court becam;1·
she deprives us of our rights of custody, and so
we come into court asking for relief.
That's the only reason we came. That's the
primary reason we came.
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And then she says: "My gosh, I had to come
to court to defend it, so he ought to pay me attorney's fees.
Now that's like heaping insult onto injury.
That just isn't fair either.
And we're here because she wouldn't do what
the decree said she should do. And I think there
ought to be sanctions imposed.
MR GUSTIN: I don't think there is any evidence as to that effect.
MR HOW ARD: Well, all of the evidence is
to that effect. And I have another brief on that
subject, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I think I would award
$600.00 for this number of depositions.
MR. HOW ARD: Then I have one other
authority to submit to you, Your Honor. And if
you will just let me have a moment, I will tell you
about that.
And I don't think the court can grant attorney's fees on the basis of the evidence. But I
would submit it.
THE COUB/f:

vY ell, I'll grant $600.00.

MR HOW ARD: All right (Rep. Tr. 83-84).
the foregoing, it is fair to assume, we believe,
lliat counsel was in agreement on the fee as fixed by the
\'OUl't bnt in disagreement as to the propriety of the Sam(\

lO
POINT II.
THE RULING ON THE
VENUE IS NOT PROPERLY
IN ANY EVENT THE VENUE
AND DEFENDANT IS NOT

MOTION FOR CHANGE OF
BEFORE THE COURT, BUT
REMAINS IN DAVIS COUNTY
PREJUDICED THEREBY.

Both parties were residents of Davis County at thl·
time of the divorce. The first paragraph of defendant\
petition alleges the divorce by action of the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County on the 17th
day of October, 1967 (R.6). There is no question concerning jurisdiction in the divorce action. Section 30-3-i,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, prior to the 1969 amendment
provides in part:
"Such subsequent changes or new orders may
be made by the court with respect to the disposal
of the children or the distribution of property
shall be reasonable and proper."
'rhere is a continuing jurisdiction of the court that
inherent in the within proceeding and this, we believe,
to be the rule announced by this court in Cody v. Cody,
47 U. 456, 154 P. 952; Bott v. Bott, 20 U.2d 329, 437 P.2d
684 and Anderson v. Anderson, 18 U.2d 89, 416 P.2d 308.
Even though the plaintiff and the minor children of
the parties are now residing in Utah 1County and while
the defendant now resides outside of the State of Utah.
once the jurisdiction of the Davis County District Court
attached by the filing of the divorce action, there is no
statutory or other right for either party to move for a
change of venue. The plaintiff is not asking for a change
of venue and so far as the convenience of the parties is

-11
1·orH·erned, the defendant who reside::; in California i::; not
ineonvmienced and there i::; nothing to indicate prejudice
on his part as bdween having the cause heard in Utah
County or in Davi::; County. Judge Cowley, as an individual judge, was a stranger to the decree as entered by
.Judge Swan in the Davis County District Court. Furthermore, the notice of appeal dated May 27, 1969 did not
refer to the Order denying the motion for change of
venue entered November 30, 1968. There should be no
time or ::;pace wasted on this facet of the appeal.

POINT III.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED.

Example::; of the rulings and of the type of evidence
by hearsay are the following:
atternptt'd to be
Q. In any event, were you able to get your
children that

A. No, I was not.
But I told my daughter Juli<c• thatMR. GUSTIN: (interposing)
that on the grounds it's hearsay.

I object tP

THE COURT: Well, I'll ::;u::;tain the ohjeetion. (Rep. Tr. 42)

* * *

Q. (by Mr. Howard) Yon had a convt>nmtion with Julie at this time.

\Vere you able to get
a result of this
A. Not on that occasion.
And I advised them that-

of your children m;
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MR UUSTIN:
minute,

(intm·posing) Now

a

We objectA. (continuing) - I would lw hy tlw nex!
morning to pick them up.

i I

THE COURT: Well, you can tell us ahont
the next morning. I'll sustain the objection to thP ' :
answer. I don't think it was responsive evrn,
iU You hadn't asked your question 1
MR. HOWARD: No. (Rep. Tr. 45)

• • •

And I said: "That may be, but I \Vant to s1•1•
him and I want to see him now."

So Joe disappeared, and in a rnonHmt he carn1'
back and he said to me, and indicated an offir(' . '
doorMR. GUSTIN: (interposing) Object to that
on the grounds it's hearsay.
THE COURT:
(Rep. Tr. 47)
Q.

I'll sustain the objection.

• • •

And what did you say to John 1

MR. GUSTIN: I object to that on the
it's hearsay.
A. I told John thatTHF, COURT: (interposing) I'll sustain th('
objection. (Rep. Tr.47)
The foregoing do not come within the category of
exceptions to the hearsay rule or the portion attributed
by defendant to Webb v. Webb, 116 U. 155, 209 P.2d 201,
or to Sine v. Harper, 118 U. 425, 222 P.2d 571. Actuall:

I
1

11·as att1•rnpting to stati- what hP had said to
.lulw and Mr. Seethaler .

: iw

.Mr. Seethaler and the diildren were in court. Whik

1

'

:Ji1»· were excluded from the courtroom at the request of
ilw dd'endant, they were nevertheless available as wit-

Their depositions had been taken by the def end:1nt. Jo11e0 on E'l/idence, Fifth Edition, Yol. 1, Sec. 231,
JI.-!+.± states the rule that we believe is applicable:

"lt has been broadly stated that the best evidl•ncl' that is obtainable under the circumstances
of the case must be adduced to prove any disputed
fact."
It is
111d tl1P

to obserw in th!• instant n•e-

following:
1iass

rl'HE COURT: I haw just heen trying to
npon evidence here.

MR. HOW ARD: Well, l acknowledgP that,
Your Honor, and I don't tliink-

'rHE COURT: (interposing) According to
what you said, you haven't acknowledged that.
What you're trying to say is that I'm kind of
<'TOOked.
MR. HOWARD: No, I'm not. I didn't mean
1o sav that at all. But I don't think the evidence
is
shallow. l think the evidence is quite deep.
I put all of the evidence I've got. This man
onh· knows what happem·d, and he's told about it.
I didn't mean to he personal about it. (Rep .
.
Tr. 84-85.
The foregoing, in Light of the presence of the children
1
ind l\lr. and Mrs. S!•dhaler, the latter who could be called

1

14
us un adverse witness, make::; appropriat<.:- t1H· follo\\'ill•'•'
language from Jones on Euidnu:e, Fifth Edition, \"ol. I.
Sec. '27, pps. 59-60, to wit:
.. rrhere is a recognized legal pre:sumption tlrnt

a party will produce evidence which i:s favorabl1 .

to him if such evidence exists and is available. And
the mere withholding or failing to product' mater
ial evidence which is available and would, in th•
circumstances of the case, be expected to be produced, gives rise to a natural inference-less forn·ful than that arising from the destruction, fabrication or suppression of evidence in which other
parties have a legal interest bnt constantly actPd 1
upon by the courts-that such evidence is held ,
back because it \Vould be unfavorable or
I
to the party withholding it. It is pertinent to nol1,
that the inference in question is not ordinarily to
be accorded weight as substantive proof, but hos I
persuasive value as discounting the credibility ol ;
the claim of the party who lws withhc.Zd the 1·1i- ·
dcnce.'' (Emphasis added).
1

1·

POINT IV.
THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT SHOWING OF CON
TEMPT UPON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF.

The notice (Exhibit 3) stated that thP defenda11t
could pick up his children on May '27.
'20tl1 wati on
a Monday and the defendant testified:
Q. Now did yon g-Pt a <·0111111tmieatiun l'ro111
thL·m later on in that week1

A.
Q.
dren1

Yes.
When did you next hear from the chil-
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l<'riday night. Julie and John called me
on t!w tekphone and told uw they didn't want to
come.
Q.

And what, in substance, did they sayf

A. Well, Julie indicated that she might like
tu come part of the summer, but she didn't want
to spend the entire summer, and that she wanted to
go to summer camp, and she had boy friends, and
she had her friends, and she felt it would be in a
strange place, and that she would rather not comp
and spend the entire smmner. In fact, she indi<·ated she didn't want to come.
Now I asked John what his reasons were, and
he was very vague. He didn't - he didn't really
g·i ve
concrde n•asons. I did, however, discover lat<•r what one of his reasons were. (Rep.
rrr. 32).
i

When defendant arrived in Provo on May 27 for
purpose of obtaining the children, he went to the Seetlialer residencl'. 'l'here was no indication of any activity
at the property. There were no cars in the driveway and
nobody answen•d the door. There was no one there (Rep.
Tr. 33-34). Defendant then went to Salt Lake and in the
·vPning of that day talked to his son John by telephone.
"l told him that I was coming to get him and to be ready.
Ht> said he didn't want to go." (Rep. Tr. 34).
1

In the interim between May 27 and June 5, defendant met Carl Seethaler at the Seethaler home who told
l1i1u that Julie and John had slept with friends the previons night at separate places. Carl said "I don't think
they want to go" in answer to the statement of the defendant that he "·as the children's father and that he had

Hi

come to get them. 'l'he ddendant thl·n :-;aid, .. \\' (•11, that.'
a matter to be decided betwPen t1H•111 and 11H·, and 1\,.
come to get them." (Rep. Tr. 36).
plant afti·1
On June 4 defendant went to the
commltation with his attorney (Rep. Tr. 38-40) and \1a.'
told that John was not there; that his mother had eo1111
and taken him (Rep. Tr. 41). He then went to the Sl'l'l·
haler residence and told Mrs. Seethaler that he had corn,
to get the children ''and she said nothing." S1H• di>appeared behind the door and in a short time Julie caltll·
to the door and told defendant that John and Brett \Wn
not there and that they had been taken to Heber Cit.1
swimming by Carl Seethaler. He then talked with Juli1
for about an hour and a half in the presence of his eonn·
sel (Rep. Tr. 42). It was the next morning, June 5, that
Mrs. Seethaler told defendant that Julie is not going and
that John was at the Seethaler plant (Rev. 'l'r. -t(i). It
was that day that defendant got Brett and J olm, the latter after the traumatic experience at the Seethaler plant
involving the Police Department and tlw J uvenill· Com1
(Rep. Tr. 46-54).

,
I

!

I

:
:

,
,

1

'I

i

:

Defendant had the hon; for the n·mainder of till' I
smmner but not Julie. The boys were taken on a
trip to Alaska and they had a good time in the cornpan:
of their father, interrupted only by defendant's work
schedule (Rep. Tr. 54-5G). At the conclusion of the su!ll· ,
mer and around August 23, defendant picked Julie np an·<l I
took her and the two boys to a gathering of
family in Wyoming, a triv that lasted about five

17
Th1\ rdationship was good between defendant and his

i:hildren and he had no reason to think tliat they lid not
affedion for him (Hep. Tr. 57).

ll<l\l'

On September '27 defendant had a tdephone converwith Julie and inquired as to where she was on the
previous weekend and was informed that she was in Salt
Lake City at a girl friend's house and had returned the
following day in the automobile "of some boy." Defendcrnt had intended to visit with Julie on the previous week1•nd but had not been able to.

Defendant made arrangements with Julie to visit him
un the 4th, 5th and 6th of October and made arrangements
· ' to have an airline pass waiting for her at the airport
which would take her to San Francisco. Julie was told
what she should bring in the way of clothing and she
I: expn•ssed an interest in the visit. The plane was to depart
from Salt Lake City at 6:10 p.m. and around 4:30 p.m.
in the afternoon of that day Julie ca:lled and said that she
was not coming because she didn't have any way to get
, to the airport; that her mother would not bring her and
had indicated to her that she didn't have to do the defendant the favor of bringing Julie to the airport. The defendant then instrncted Julie to go by bus from Provo to Salt
Lalw and determined that Julie wanted to do so (Rep. Tr.
1

.

At this point, the objection was made and sustained
dt>fendant from going into matters subsequent
to the filing of his petition, which petition was filed SeplP1tilwr 10, 19ti8 ( Hep. 'l1r. 61). At the time of the hearing

IS

Julie was 17 years of age, a junior in high school at Provo,
and John was 14 years of age (Rep. Tr. 65).
Defendant expressed himself as being critical of lht
mother's approach to the children, thinking that she wa'
very permissive with the daughter Julie and referred to
the incident about Julie being taken to Salt Lake City and
left over the weekend unsupervised, to come home "witlt
some boy." The defendant stated that the mother didn't
know who Julie was really going to ride home with and
that she did not know what kind of a driver the boy
The defendant posed a question as to whether the mother
knew exactly where the girl was overnight, where she actually went, and who she was with during the evening:
"I've gone there at times when the daughter
wasn't there and was told that she didn't know
where the girl was, or that the girl was at school,
or that she might be at some game, or she might
be at some ball game.

I object to
(Rep. Tr. 64).

\
I

:
:
1

1

•
,
·
I

1

i

I

i

'
·
·
i

rrhe mother isn't there.'' !

On the claim of alimation and notwithstanding th1 .
admitted love and affection of the children toward the i
father, the defendant testified that the plaintiff had told I
the children that he was a person of unsound mentality, •
interested in money only, and an unclean, i1mnoral person
and concluded that the plaintiff had by one means or another caused the children to feel that it's not a suitabli· I
thing to go to live with him. The defendant said, "I point i
to the record" (Rep. Tr. 67-68).
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J ndge Cowley who heard the matter is a trial judge of
long
a capable and understanding individl,lal.
!IP ob:-;erved that the defendant had the two boys beginnmg on June G, that they had a good time after he got
l!wm ( Rt'lJ. Tr. 72) and that hmnan relations aren't
' allrn»s the easiest thing to carry out, work out, ·with easl'
! (RPp. 'l'r. 7:3).

!

On May 20 when the defendant arrived in Provo, he
11a;:; met by all of the childrein who knew what he was there
for. He frustrated his own plan by telling the children
to go back and get the items listed in Exhibit 3 (Rep. Tr.
:JO). :B'rom that point on there was confusion attributed
to the individual thinking of the children, their vacillation
in their own sphere of activity and wisely and properly
the trial court dismissed the contempt proceeding on the
in::;ufficiency of the defendant's testimony.
POINT V.
CHANGE OF CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN AS A
PUNITIVE MEASURE WOULD BE IMPROPER.

This court as recently as May, 1969, in the case of
Hyde, ----···· U ......... , 454 P.2d 884 reiterated the
l1asic eoncept as follows:

lfl/(/r: 1•.

"Child custody proceedings are equitable in
the highest degree, and this court has consistently
Jwld that the best interest and welfare of the minor
ehild is the controlling factor in every case. Walton
11. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97, and cases
there cited."
The Idaho case of Thurman v. Thurman, 245 P.2d
'IO <'ikd hy dPfendant and other case authority to the

20

same effect do not coincide with the views of this court
and should not govern the instant case.

CONCLUSION

Defendant's claim that plaintiff should be held iu
contempt is based upon his own testimony. He admittPil
that his testimony was the only evidence he had. Thi
failure to interrogate the plaintiff and his failure to call
the children whose depositions he had taken reflect upon
the credibility of his conclusions. The defendant obtained I
monetary relief and there is no quarrel with the plain-1
tiff having been deleted from the life insurance tnrnt.
The judgment of dismissal with regard to contempt and
the attempted change of custody is sound and was judiCiously made in light of the evidence presented. The judgment should be affirmed with such relief to the plaintiff
in the defense of the appeal as the court may deem proper
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN & GUSTIN
By Harley W. Gustin
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent.

